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In 1971, Ezra Mishan brilliantly satirized the views of a Dr. 
Pangloss, who argued that a world of largely unregulated pollu- 
tion was "optimal" because cleanup would involve enormous 
transaction costs.' Less than 15 years later, Professor Latin uses 
the same Panglossian argument to rationalize the current regula- 
tory status quo.2 He not only accepts but endorses our extraordi- 
narily crude, costly, litigious and counterproductive system of 
technology-based environmental controls. Like Mishan's Pan- 
gloss, he seems to believe that if it were possible to have a better 
world, it would exist. Since it does not, the transaction costs in- 
volved in regulatory improvement must exceed the benefits. Pro- 
posals for basic change accordingly are dismissed as naive 
utopianism. 
What explains this celebration of the regulatory status quo? 
As critics of the present system, we believe this question to be of 
more than academic interest. The present regulatory system 
wastes tens of billions of dollars every year, misdirects resources, 
stifles innovation, and spawns massive and often counterproduc- 
tive litigation. There is a variety of fundamental but practical 
changes that could be made to improve its environmental and 
economic performance. Why have such changes not been 
adopted? Powerful organized interests have a vested stake in the 
t We are grateful to Errol Meidinger for his thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
* Beekman Professor of Law & Philosophy, Columbia University. 
** Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard University. 
1. Mishan, Pangloss on Pollution, 73 SWED.J. ECON. 1 (1971). While tempted to emu- 
late Mishan, we have (recognizing our comparative disadvantage) eschewed satire and 
have chosen to present an affirmative program for reform. 
2. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Effciency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
"Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985). 
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status quo. The congressional committees, government bureau- 
cracies, and industry and environmental groups that have helped 
to shape the present system want to see it perpetuated.3 But the 
current system is also bolstered by an often inarticulate sense 
that, however cumbersome, it "works," and that complexity and 
limited information make major improvements infeasible. 
Professor Latin has performed an important service in provid- 
ing an articulate, informed, and sophisticated exposition of this 
view. By developing and making transparent the arguments that 
might justify the status quo, he has made it easier to assess their 
merits. If, as we believe, those arguments lack merit, his sophisti- 
cated defense of the status quo may ultimately serve to hasten its 
demise. 
We will not respond to all of the groundless charges that Pro- 
fessor Latin levels at the critics of the current system, ourselves 
included. We focus instead on the major flaws in his defense of 
existing law and policy. First, Latin's view is based on a Panglos- 
sian interpretation of the status quo. The current system does 
not in fact "work" and its malfunctions, like those of Soviet-style 
central planning, will become progressively more serious as the 
economy grows and changes and our knowledge of environmen- 
tal problems develops. 
Second, Latin mistakenly treats economic incentive systems as 
a form of regulatory "fine-tuning," rather than recognizing them 
as fundamental alternatives to our current reliance on centralized 
regulatory commands to implement environmental goals. More- 
over, he completely ignores experience showing that economic 
incentive systems are feasible and effective. 
Third, Latin ignores the increasingly urgent need to improve 
the process by which Congress, the agencies, and the courts set 
environmental goals. He is mesmerized by decisionmaking costs, 
ignoring the great social benefits flowing from a more intelligent 
and democratically accountable dialogue on environmental pol- 
icy. We deal with each of these points in turn. 
I. THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
The existing system of pollution regulation, which is the focus 
3. See generally Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Adminis- 
trative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 655. The forces favoring as well as those opposing 
reform are examined in Weidinger, On Explaining the Development of "Emissions Trading" in 
U.S. Air Pollution Policy, 7 LAW & POL'Y 457 (1985). 
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of Latin's defense, is primarily based on a Best Available Tech- 
nology (BAT) strategy. If an industrial process or product gener- 
ates some nontrivial risk, the responsible plant or industry must 
install whatever technology is available to reduce or eliminate 
this risk, so long as the costs of doing so will not cause a shut- 
down of the plant or industry. BAT requirements are largely de- 
termined through uniform federal regulations. Under the Clean 
Water Act's BAT strategy, the EPA adapts nationally uniform ef- 
fluent limitations for some 500 different industries. A similar 
BAT strategy is deployed under the Clean Air Act for new indus- 
trial sources of air pollution, new automobiles, and industrial 
sources of toxic air pollutants.4 BAT strategies are also widely 
used in many fields of environmental regulation other than air 
and water pollution, which are the focus of Latin's analysis.5 
BAT was embraced by Congress and administrators in the 
early 1970s in order to impose immediate, readily enforceable 
federal controls on a relatively few widespread pollutants, while 
avoiding widespread industrial shutdowns. Subsequent experi- 
ence and analysis has demonstrated: 
1. Uniform BAT requirements waste many billions of dollars 
annually6 by ignoring variations among plants and industries in 
the cost of reducing pollution and by ignoring geographic varia- 
tions in pollution effects. A more cost-effective strategy of risk 
reduction could free enormous resources for additional pollution 
reduction or other purposes. 
2. BAT controls, and the litigation they provoke, impose dis- 
4. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. ?? 7411(a)(l), 7412, 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (1982) (amending 
42 U.S.C. ?? 1857-58(a) (1976)). Under other portions of the Clean Air Act, regulation 
of existing industrial sources of certain widespread pollutants is based, in theory, on the 
achievement of uniform federal air quality standards, rather than available technology. 
See id. ?? 7409, 7410. In practice, however, the controls imposed on sources in regions 
that do not comply with the federal air quality standards are based on "reasonably avail- 
able control measures"-a form of BAT. See id. ? 7502(b)(2). 
5. Examples include control of low-level radioactive emissions from normal opera- 
tion of nuclear power plants and standards for treatment and disposal of toxic sub- 
stances under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. ?? 6901-87 (1982). Rather than rely on uniform standards 
requiring that a category of plants or products meet BAT requirements, some environ- 
mental regulatory programs use case-by-case screening of particular products or devel- 
opment projects under open-ended criteria such as "unreasonable risk." See Stewart, 
Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 
1259, 1263-66 (1981). While our proposals for reform focus on air and water pollution 
control, we consider briefly their possible application to these other areas of environ- 
mental law. See note 39 and text accompanying notes 63-64 infra. 
6. See text accompanying notes 10-16, infra. 
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proportionate penalties on new products and processes. A BAT 
strategy typically imposes far more stringent controls on new 
sources because there is no risk of shutdown. Also, new plants 
and products must run the gauntlet of lengthy regulatory and 
legal proceedings to win approval; the resulting uncertainty and 
delay discourage new investment. By contrast, existing sources 
can use the delays and costs of the legal process to burden regu- 
lators and postpone or "water-down" compliance. BAT strate- 
gies also impose disproportionate burdens on more productive 
and profitable industries because these industries can "afford" 
more stringent controls. This "soak the rich" approach penalizes 
growth and international competitiveness.7 
3. BAT controls can ensure that established control technol- 
ogies are installed. They do not, however, provide strong incen- 
tives for the development of new, environmentally superior 
strategies, and may actually discourage their development. Such 
innovations are essential for maintaining long-term economic 
growth without simultaneously increasing pollution and other 
forms of environmental degradation.8 
4. BAT involves the centralized determination of complex 
scientific, engineering, and economic issues regarding the feasi- 
bility of controls on hundreds of thousands of pollution sources. 
7. On the differential treatment of old and new sources and resulting implications 
for investment and productivity, see Crandall, The Political Economy of Clean Air: Practical 
Constraints on White House Review, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 205, 215-21 (V. Smith ed. 1984); Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 
69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983); Stewart, supra note 5. For the impact of domestic environ- 
mental regulatory policies on United States international competitiveness, see J. Kalt, 
The Impact of Domestic Environmental Regulatory Policies on U.S. International Com- 
petitiveness, in ENERGY AND ENVTL. POL'Y CENTER, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, 
HARV. U., DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES E-85-02, (1985). For suggestive evidence that the 
current BAT system gives a comparative competitive advantage to large plants within a 
regulated industry, see Pashigian, The Efect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant 
Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1984). 
8. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 24-27 (1977); Stewart, supra 
note 5. In attacking the treatment of innovation in the latter work, Latin wrongly sug- 
gests that it advocates sacrifice of environmental objectives in favor of market invest- 
ment and productivity gains ("economic innovation"). As Stewart's article makes quite 
clear, economic incentives are also needed to promote innovation in the development 
and adoption of environmentally superior technologies ("social innovation"). In con- 
trast to BAT, market incentives allow the two forms of innovation to complement each 
other, encouraging new investments that are at the same time environmentally and eco- 
nomically superior. 
For a more optimistic view of the ability of a BAT approach to stimulate social inno- 
vation, see Ashford, Ayres & Stone, Using Regulation to Change the Marketfor Innovation, 9 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985). 
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Such determinations impose massive information-gathering bur- 
dens on administrators, and provide a fertile ground for com- 
plex litigation in the form of massive adversary rulemaking 
proceedings and protracted judicial review. Given the high costs 
of regulatory compliance and the potential gains from litigation 
brought to defeat or delay regulatory requirements, it is often 
more cost-effective for industry to "invest" in such litigation 
rather than to comply.9 
5. A BAT strategy is inconsistent with intelligent priority set- 
ting. Simply regulating to the hilt whatever pollutants happen to 
get on the regulatory agenda may preclude an agency from deal- 
ing adequately with more serious problems that come to scien- 
tific attention later. BAT also tends to reinforce regulatory 
inertia. Foreseeing that "all or nothing" regulation of a given 
substance under BAT will involve large administrative and com- 
pliance costs, and recognizing that resources are limited, agen- 
cies often seek to limit sharply the number of substances on the 
agenda for regulatory action.'0 
This indictment is not idle speculation, but the product of 
years of patient study by lawyers, economists, and political scien- 
tists." There are, for example, no fewer than 15 careful efforts 
9. See Stewart, supra note 5; R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 193-238 (1983). 
10. See Harrison, Haig & Nichols, Benefits Assessment and Environmental Regulation: 
Case Studies of Hazardous Pollutants, in ENERGY AND ENVrL. POL'Y CENTER,JOHN F. KENNEDY 
SCH. OF GOV'T, HARV. U., DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES E-83-07 (1983); Dorfman, The Les- 
sons of Pesticide Regulation, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 13 (W. Magat ed. 
1982); Crandall & Portney, Environmental Policy, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVI- 
RONMENT: THE REAGAN APPROACH 48-49, 72-73 (R. Portney ed. 1984). 
11. For an up-to-date review of relevant sources, see the bibliographies at the end 
of each chapter compiled by T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN RE- 
FORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985). The development of the reformist critique may be 
traced in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER, supra note 7; NAT- 
URAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REAGAN APPROACH, supra note 10; R. 
CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
CLEAN AIR (1983); R. MELNICK, supra note 9; R. NOLL & B. OWEN, supra note 3; INCEN- 
TIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (T. 
Schelling ed. 1983); W. MAGAT, supra note 3; L. LAVE, STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: 
DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY (1981); B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/ 
DIRTY AIR (1981); J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 8; W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE 
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN,J. SAWYER 
& D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974); J. 
DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING 
WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS (1968); Stewart, Econom- 
ics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985); Stewart, 
supra note 5; Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro-and Micro-Mistakes, 
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to estimate the extra cost burden generated by a wide range of 
traditional legalistic BAT systems used to control a variety of air 
and water pollutants in different parts of the country. Of the 
twelve studies of different air pollutants'2-ranging from particu- 
lates to chlorofluorocarbons-seven indicated that traditional 
forms of regulation were more than 400% more expensive than 
the least-cost solution; four revealed that they were about 75% 
more expensive; one suggested a modest cost-overrun of 7%.013 
22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323 (1974); Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CAN. J. 
ECON. 512 (1973). 
12. For an up-to-date review of empirical research, along with a table that usefully 
summarizes the results of eleven of the air pollution studies, see T. TIETENBERG, supra 
note 11, at 39-52. 
In addition to the 11 studies summarized by Tietenberg, some excellent unpub- 
lished work by McGartland and Oates. See McGartland & Oates, Marketable Permits for the 
Prevention of Environmental Deterioration, -J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. - (198-) (forth- 
coming). This study estimates that traditional regulation in the Baltimore area is at least 
twice as expensive as a least-cost approach. We have therefore counted it among the 
four studies we have placed in the second of the three crude categories presented in the 
text. 
13. This was the study of sulfate pollution in Los Angeles. Hahn & Noll, Designing 
a Market for Tradable Emission Permits, in W. MAGAT, supra note 3, at 39-52. Two impor- 
tant factors help account for the anomalous character of the Hahn and Noll findings: 
First, in contrast to other areas, the command-and-control strategy in Cali- 
fornia did not include scrubbers, a very expensive approach. Had California 
required scrubbers, the potential cost savings would have been higher. 
Another reason, of more general applicability, is that the amount of con- 
trol required [to reach air quality objectives in Los Angeles] is so great that 
every source is forced to control as much as is economically feasible. By defini- 
tion, little further control can be undertaken. Therefore . . . the divergence 
between the command-and-control and least-cost allocation would be small. 
T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 45. It should be noted that existing federal law now 
requires the installation of scrubbers on all new coal-burning power plants in Los Ange- 
les. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 11, at 101-03. As a consequence, 
Tietenberg's first point emphasizes the limited power of Hahn and Noll's conclusions 
even in the extreme situation posed by Los Angeles. 
A recent study by Anderson comes to a less certain conclusion. Anderson, Marketa- 
ble Pollution Permits and Acid Rain Externalities, 16 CAN. J. ECON. 704 (1983). While it finds 
that marketable rights schemes could generate significant savings in reaching Cleve- 
land's local sulfur dioxide goals, it reaches a more equivocal conclusion once Cleve- 
land's contribution to the larger North American acid rain problem is taken into 
account. Given Cleveland's strategic geographic location in the Midwest, any plausible 
solution to acid rain would require all its polluters to treat at very high levels-so high 
that the cost difference between marketable rights and a more traditional system would 
be substantially reduced. In respect to its contribution to acid rain, then, Cleveland 
seems similar to the case of Los Angeles discussed by Hahn and Noll. 
Of course, Cleveland is but one of the many sources of the acid rain problem exper- 
ienced by Canada and the northeastern United States. Unfortunately, however, Ander- 
son has not yet moved beyond Cleveland to study the cost-saving potential of an acid 
rain marketable rights scheme for the entire North American acid rain control region. 
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Three studies of water pollution control in five different water- 
sheds also indicate the serious inefficiency of traditional forms of 
command-and-control regulation.14 These careful studies of se- 
lected problems cannot be used to estimate precisely the total 
amount traditional forms of regulation are annually costing the 
American people.'5 Nonetheless, very large magnitudes are at 
stake. Even if a reformed system could cut costs by "only" one- 
third, it could save more than $15 billion a year from the nation's 
annual expenditure of $50 billion on air and water pollution con- 
Telephone conversation (September 17, 1985). Thus, his study does not permit any 
firm conclusion on the cost-saving potential of a marketable rights scheme in the regula- 
tory response to the acid rain problem. As a consequence, we have omitted it from the 
studies summarized in the text. 
14. These water studies are somewhat less suggestive than are the air studies. 
They all have to do with the removal of a single (albeit important) water pollutant: bio- 
chemical oxygen demand. Moreover, they do not expressly deal with the precise form of 
BAT regulation actually used under the present Clean Water Act. Instead, the studies 
investigate a more primitive form of regulation that does not, like BAT, require different 
cutbacks from different industries depending on the best available technology in each 
economic sector. Instead, the traditional regulatory approach used as a benchmark in 
the water studies simply requires all dischargers, regardless of industry, to cut back 
wasteloads proportionally to reach water quality objectives. This proportionate reduc- 
tion would be equivalent to BAT only if the best available technology in every industry 
permits all industries to cut back by the same percentage. While BAT often does lead to 
this result, the proportionality assumption invoked by all existing water pollution studies 
can only serve as a crude approximation of BAT's economic impact. Nonetheless, the 
existing data does suggest the possibility of substantial savings by abandoning BAT, 
though the overruns are somewhat less substantial than those suggested by the air stud- 
ies. Four of the computer studies suggest that traditional regulation is more than twice 
as expensive as the least-cost program; six suggest an overrun in the 40-60% range; 
while four indicate extra costs of 12-40%. A summary of these studies appears in T. 
TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 42-43. 
15. Speaking broadly, the empirical estimates we have summarized in the text are 
generated by procedures that overestimate BAT's short-term costs, while underesti- 
mating its long-term costs. Thus, on the one hand, the computer models do not gener- 
ally take into account that many polluters have already sunk capital into treatment 
facilities that would never have been required under a cost-minimizing regulatory 
scheme. This leads to an overestimate of the short-term savings of regulatory reform 
because it ignores that some existing equipment might be operated cheaply in the short 
run, however inefficient it was to install in the first place. On the other hand, existing 
cost estimates are generated by static models that do not take into account the BAT 
regime's depressive effect on the rate of pollution control innovation. See text accompa- 
nying notes 18-19 infra. As a consequence, even the very large cost-overruns presented 
in the text underestimate likely realities 10 or 20 years in the future. These and other 
useful interpretive points may be found in Professor Tietenberg's recent review of the 
evidence. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 38-53. We do not think a lengthy elabo- 
ration of his discussion is necessary to make our basic point: By even the most conserva- 
tive reckoning, the economic savings promised by a successful reform are substantial 
indeed. 
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trol alone.16 
While Latin entirely fails to address this evidence, he does not 
seriously contest the economic wastefulness of the current sys- 
tem's excessive compliance costs and penalties on new invest- 
ment. He simply ignores the last three points in our indictment, 
even though they have been well developed in the literature. In- 
stead, Latin spends all his time castigating all reform proposals as 
unrealistic. In his view, reformers characteristically propose uto- 
pian efforts at administrative "fine-tuning" that would in practice 
lead to a bureaucratic nightmare, making the present system 
seem benign by comparison. 
We do not accept this despairing view. To explain why, how- 
ever, we must correct an analytic deficiency in Latin's critique. 
The various reforms rejected in his article have little in common 
with one another-except that they all represent departures from 
BAT. Indeed, it is a sign of Latin's deep commitment to the sta- 
tus quo that, simply because they depart from BAT, he thinks of 
them as if they were all variations on the problem of "fine-tun- 
ing" that he decries. But "fine-tuning" is much too diffuse a no- 
tion on which to base an analysis of the reform agenda. Some of 
our proposals involve reform of the criteria and procedures 
which Congress, agencies, and the courts use in setting environmen- 
tal goals; others involve reform of the means by which the goals 
(whatever they may be) are implemented in the real world. Latin's 
indiscriminate condemnation of "fine-tuning" fails to distinguish 
systematically between these two types of proposals. In this, as in 
so much else, his critique is faithful to the BAT system, which 
also conflates means and ends, preventing the intelligent assess- 
ment of either. If, however, we are to move beyond the status 
quo, it is best to treat these two different kinds of structural re- 
form separately, beginning with the implementation problem 
and concluding with the question of goal-setting.17 
16. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, THE COST OF 
CLEAN AIR AND WATER (1984) (estimating expenditures to comply with federal air and 
water pollution control expenditures in the ten years 1981-1990 at $525 billion (in con- 
stant 1981 dollars)). Moreover, we also think that our reforms are applicable to many 
other kinds of pollution as well. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text. 
17. While, as we hope to show, this simple means-end schema clarifies the reform 
agenda, it can lead to distortions of its own. In particular, it may be used to blind one to 
the complex ways in which a particular implementation scheme shapes the standard- 
setting process over time-and vice versa. See Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1644, 1661-62 (1975). We shall, however, try to be attentive to this very 
important factor in the ensuing discussion. See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text. 
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II. IMPLEMENTATION 
A BAT system has an implicit environmental goal: achieve- 
ment of the environmental quality level that would result if all 
sources installed BAT controls on their discharges. The usual 
means for implementing this goal are centralized, industry-uni- 
form regulations that command specific amounts of cleanup from 
specific polluters. When a polluter receives an air or water per- 
mit under existing law, the piece of paper does not content itself, 
in the manner of Polonius, with the vague advice that he "use the 
best available technology." Instead, the permit tries to be as 
quantitatively precise as possible, telling each discharger how 
much of the regulated pollutants he may discharge.18 
Although Latin condemns us as unrealistic, our reforms build 
upon, rather than abandon, this basic permit system. Indeed, we 
have only two, albeit far-reaching, objections to the existing per- 
mit mechanism. First, existing permits are free. This is bad be- 
cause it gives the polluter no incentive to reduce his wastes below 
the permitted amount. Second, they are non-transferable. This 
is bad because polluter A is obliged to cut back his own wastes 
even if it is cheaper for him to pay his neighbor B to undertake 
the extra cleanup instead. 
Our basic reform would respond to these deficiencies by al- 
lowing polluters to buy and sell each other's permits-thereby 
creating a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up 
most cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs 
are highest. This reform will, at one stroke, cure many of the 
basic flaws of the existing command-and-control regulatory sys- 
tems discussed earlier. 
A system of tradeable rights will tend to bring about a least- 
18. While the text describes the existing system's implicit regulatory objective, in 
fact the process of writing, monitoring, and enforcing permits is the Achilles heel of the 
BAT strategy. See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra. While officials in Washington 
promulgate regulations that are supposed to govern the operation of every plant in an 
industry, such regulations must be adapted to the specific and varying conditions of 
different plants throughout the nation. Thus, the actual writing of permits is often ac- 
complished by low-level state or federal field personnel. These permits are often vague 
and obsolescent. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 
(1981). Moreover, enforcement of permit conditions is often ineffective. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFF., WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH EPA CONTROL PER- 
MITS (1983); Roberts & Farrell, The Political Economy of Implementation: The Clean Air Act and 
Stationary Sources in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 152 (A. Friedlander 
ed. 1978). See text accompanying notes 19-33 infra for the reasons we believe that a 
reformed system of transferable permits will tend to alleviate these problems. 
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cost allocation of control burdens, saving many billions of dollars 
annually.19 It will eliminate the disproportionate burdens that 
BAT imposes on new and more productive industries by treating 
all sources of the same pollutant on the same basis.20 It will pro- 
vide positive economic rewards for polluters who develop envi- 
ronmentally superior products and processes.21 It will, as we 
show below,22 reduce the incentives for litigation, simplify the is- 
sues in controversy, and facilitate more intelligent setting of 
priorities. 
Would allowing the sale of permits lead to a bureaucratic 
nightmare? Before proceeding to the new administrative bur- 
dens marketability will generate, it is wise to pause, as Latin does 
not, to consider marketability's great administrative advantages. 
First, marketability would immediately eliminate most of the 
information-processing tasks that are presently overwhelming 
the federal and state bureaucracies. No longer would the EPA be 
required to conduct endless adversary proceedings to determine 
the best available control technologies in each major industry of 
the United States, and to defend its determinations before the 
courts; nor would federal and state officials be required to spend 
vast amounts of time and energy in adapting these changing na- 
19. An emissions trading system tends to achieve a least-cost allocation of control 
for all sources by forcing them to pay the same price for pollution. In practice, a regu- 
lated emission trading market is likely to deviate somewhat from the perfect market 
ideal, but substantial cost savings will still be achieved. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 
11, at 50-56. 
20. Equal treatment of old and new sources will not necessarily lead, as Latin ap- 
parently fears, to shutdowns of old plants. It is true, of course, that old plants may 
evade clean-up under BAT if their profits are too low to bear the expense. Because of 
concern over shutdown, they are often allowed to discharge large wasteloads that could 
otherwise be treated at low cost. The tradeable permits strategy, however, can provide 
the needed financing for cleanup by enabling the old plant to sell its pollution rights to 
others. Thus, a marketable rights system may allow old plants to stay in business and 
clean up. If shutdown does occur, it may be more readily accepted as the product of 
market forces rather than as a deliberate, isolated government decision. 
If the unemployment and dislocation caused by plant shutdowns due to pollution 
control programs are judged unacceptable, the appropriate response is not, as Latin 
advocates, to weaken the program or impose disproportionate controls on new sources 
so as to throttle investment and productivity gains. The appropriate response is reme- 
dial: Compensation programs should be designed to deal with unemployment and 
dislocation. 
21. See Levin, Getting There: Implementing the "Bubble" Policy, in SOCIAL REGULATION: 
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 59 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds. 1982); Stewart, supra note 5, at 
1309-11, 1332-37; REGULATORY REFORM STAFF, U.S. EPA, EMISSIONS TRADING REPORT 
(May 10, 1984). 
22. See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra. 
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tional guidelines to the particular conditions of every important 
pollution source in the United States. Instead of giving the job of 
economic and technological assessment to bureaucrats, the mar- 
ketable rights mechanism would put the information-processing 
burden precisely where it belongs: upon business managers and 
engineers who are in the best position to figure out how to cut 
back on their plants' pollution costs. If the managers operating 
plant A think they can clean up a pollutant more cheaply than 
those in charge of plant B, they should be expected to sell some 
of their pollution rights to B at a mutually advantageous price; 
cleanup will occur at the least cost without the need for constant 
bureaucratic decisions about the best available technology. Latin 
seriously misleads when he describes a marketable permit sys- 
tem as one involving administrative "fine-tuning." To the con- 
trary, it is the existing system of command-and-control 
regulation that envisions inevitably ill-informed bureaucrats con- 
tinually "fine-tuning" technological and economic decisions best 
made by the people operating the plants. 
Second, marketable permits would open up enormous finan- 
cial resources for effective and informed regulation. While pol- 
luters would have the right to trade their permits among 
themselves during the n years23 they are valid, they would be 
obliged to buy new ones when their permits expired at an auction 
held by the EPA in each watershed and air quality control region. 
These auctions would raise substantial sums of money for the 
government on a continuing basis. While no study has yet at- 
tempted to make global estimates for the United States as a 
whole, existing work suggests that auction revenues could well 
equal the amount polluters would spend in cost-minimizing con- 
trol activities.24 Even if revenues turned out to be a third of this 
amount, the government would still be collecting more than 
$6-10 billion a year. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that Congress would allow the EPA (and associated state agen- 
cies) to retain a substantial share of these revenues. Since the 
23. All permits would not have to expire at the same time. For a discussion of 
systems that allow for variable time periods and differential privileges during emergency 
conditions, see T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at ch. 7; B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, supra note 11, at 268; J. DALE, supra note 11, at 95. 
24. T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 102-13, contains a comprehensive discussion 
of existing data. He concludes: "Of the 39 numerical entries [in his summary tables] 
permit expenditures are at least as great as control costs in 22 cases. . . . Large permit 
expenditures are the normal, rather than the exceptional, outcome." Id. at 106. 
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current EPA operating budget is $1.3 billion,25 using even a frac- 
tion of the auction fund to improve regulatory analyses, research, 
and monitoring would allow a great leap forward in the sophisti- 
cation of the regulatory effort-something Latin says he sup- 
ports, but is unable to find any practical way of achieving.26 
Given its revenue-raising potential, environmental reform is 
hardly a politically unrealistic pipe dream. To the contrary, it is 
only a matter of time before the enormous federal deficit forces 
Congress and the President to consider the revenue-raising po- 
tential of an auction scheme.27 
Third, the auction system would help correct one of the worst 
weaknesses of the present system: the egregious failure of the 
EPA and associated state agencies to enforce the laws on the 
books in a timely and effective way. Part of the problem stems 
from the ability of existing polluters to delay regulatory imple- 
mentation by using legal proceedings to challenge the economic 
and engineering bases of BAT regulations and permit condi- 
tions. But agencies also invest so little in monitoring28 that they 
25. See Davis, Reagan Boosts EPA Funding, Slashes Interior Spending, 43 CONG. WEEKLY 
REP. 255 (1985). This figure excludes municipal water treatment subsidies and 
Superfund cleanup, but includes all regulatory programs, including pesticides, hazard- 
ous waste, drinking water, and chemicals as well as air and water pollution regulation. 
26. See Latin, supra note 1, at 1279. 
27. Not that the political fight for an auction will be an easy one. Apart from 
thoughtful people like Latin, who are committed by conviction to the status quo, our 
market reform will be opposed by businesses who (despite their promarket rhetoric) will 
predictably resist the prospect of buying pollution rights after all these years of polluting 
for free. Nonetheless, we believe that the reformist claim that the air and water of 
America belong to the people, and that polluters should pay if they wish to use it for 
limited periods, has enormous popular appeal. While it is possible to design efficient 
auction systems that ameliorate, or eliminate entirely, the financial burdens imposed 
upon polluters, see T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 100-13 (and sources cited therein), 
we would oppose these schemes on principle. We believe that just as firms are obliged 
to pay for other raw materials they require for their production process, they should be 
obliged to pay for the air and water they degrade. (Unlike current proposals to impose 
new taxes on all industries to finance toxic cleanup, tradeable permits would make 
sources pay in proportion to their contribution to pollution.) 
The only exception we believe justified-for distributional and other reasons-is 
one for domestic waste processed by municipal sewage authorities. Congress could ac- 
commodate this interest by ordering the EPA to give each municipality free permits 
based on the normal domestic waste produced by the average American. Cities could, of 
course, then make money by selling these rights to firms if private cleanup is relatively 
more expensive than public. In addition, Congress might well accommodate individual 
polluter interests by allowing a transitional period of free use, see note 20 supra, in order 
to soften adjustment pains and reduce political opposition. 
28. Total federal, state, and local expenditure on air quality monitoring averaged 
only $44 million a year during the four fiscal years between 1978 and 1981-.02% of the 
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must rely on polluters for the bulk of their data on discharges. 
Since polluters are predictably reluctant to report their own vio- 
lations, the current system perpetuates a Panglossian view of reg- 
ulatory reality. For example, a General Accounting Office 
investigation of 921 major air polluters officially considered to be 
in compliance revealed 200, or 22%, to be violating their per- 
mits; in one region, the number not complying was 52%.29 Even 
when illegal polluters are identified, they are not effectively sanc- 
tioned: The EPA's Inspector General in 1984 found that it was a 
common practice for water pollution officials to respond to viola- 
tions by issuing administrative orders that effectively legitimized 
excess discharges.30 Thus, while the system may, after protracted 
litigation, eventually "work" to force the slow installation of ex- 
pensive control machinery, there is no reason to think this ma- 
chinery will run well when eventually installed. Although there 
are many reasons for this appalling weakness in enforcement, 
one stands out above all others: The present system does not put 
pressure on agency policymakers to make the large investments 
in monitoring and personnel that are required to make the tedi- 
ous and unending work of credible enforcement a bureaucratic 
reality. 
The auction system would change existing compliance incen- 
tives dramatically. It would reduce the opportunity and incentive 
of polluters to use the legal system for delay and obstruction by 
finessing the complex BAT issues, and it would limit dispute to 
the question of whether a source's discharges exceeded its per- 
mits. It would also eliminate the possibility of using the legal 
system to postpone implementation of regulatory requirements 
by requiring the polluter that lost its legal challenge to pay for 
the permits it would have been obliged to buy during the entire 
estimated costs of air pollution control during this period. See Crandall, supra note 7, at 
220. Crandall goes on to report: 
In 1979, the GAO reported that as many as 81 percent of all monitoring sites 
had one or more problems that could affect data reliability. In response, EPA 
developed a plan to assure that a total of more than five thousand monitors be 
sited and operated in a reliable fashion by federal, state, and local authorities. 
By the end of 1981, GAO reported that only about one-half of all monitors met 
EPA specifications. 
Id. 
29. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN CONTROLLING MAJOR AIR 
POLLUTION SOURCES 9 (1979) (Report CEP-78-165). 
30. 5 INSIDE EPA Report No. 11, at 6 (March 16, 1984). For other critiques of 
agency implementation efforts, see Roberts & Farrell, supra note 18; Crandall & Portney, 
supra note 10 at 42-49, 69. 
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intervening period of noncompliance (plus interest).31 
The marketable permit system would also provide much 
stronger incentives for effective monitoring and enforcement. If 
polluters did not expect rigorous enforcement during the term of 
their permits, this fact would show up at the auction in dramati- 
cally lower bids: Why pay a lot for the right to pollute legally 
when one can pollute illegally without serious risk of detection? 
Under a marketable permit approach, this problem would be at 
the center of bureaucratic attention. For if, as we envisage, the 
size of the budget available to the EPA and state agencies would 
depend on total auction revenues, the bureaucracy's failure to in- 
vest adequately in enforcement would soon show up in a poten- 
tially dramatic drop in auction income available for the next 
budgetary period. This is not a prospect that top EPA adminis- 
trators will take lightly. Monitoring and enforcement will be- 
come agency priorities of the first importance. Moreover, permit 
holders may themselves support strong enforcement in order to 
ensure that cheating by others does not depreciate the value of 
the permit holders' investments.32 
A system of marketable permits, then, not only promises to 
save Americans many billions of dollars a year, to reward innova- 
tive improvements in existing clean-up techniques, and to elimi- 
nate the BAT system's penalty on new, productive investment. It 
also offers formidable administrative advantages. It relieves 
agencies of the enormous information-processing burdens that 
overwhelm them under the BAT system; it greatly reduces litiga- 
tion and delay; it offers a rich source of budgetary revenue in a 
period of general budgetary stringency; and it forces agencies to 
give new importance to the critical business of enforcing the law 
in a way that America's polluters will take seriously. Despite his 
emphasis on administrative realities, Latin has failed to take any 
of these advantages seriously.33 Instead, he speaks forebodingly 
31. In addition, of course, a fine should be imposed if a polluter's discharges ex- 
ceeded the permits it has acquired. Such a fine should be based not only on the extent 
of the excess but also its duration: $X per unit of excess emission per day. While non- 
compliance penalties can be added on to a regulatory approach, see Drayton, Economic 
Law Enforcement, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1980), they appear to have played a minor 
role to date. 
32. The opposition of New York taxi companies to competition by gypsy cabs with- 
out medallions shows that this is by no means a fanciful prospect. 
33. While he mentions the first perfunctorily, he completely ignores the other 
three. 
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of the dangers of "fine-tuning" that the market reform entails. 
What precisely are these dangers? 
The reformed system we have described involves the execu- 
tion of four bureaucratic tasks. First, the agency must estimate 
how much pollution presently is permitted by law in each water- 
shed and air quality region. Second, it must run a system of fair 
and efficient auctions in which polluters can regularly buy rights 
for limited terms. Third, it must run an efficient title registry in 
each region that will allow buyers and sellers to transfer rights in 
a legally effective way. Fourth, it must consistently penalize pol- 
luters who discharge more than their permitted amounts. 
And that's that. So far as the fourth bureaucratic task is con- 
cerned, we have already given reasons to believe that the EPA 
would enforce the law far more effectively under the new regime 
than it does at present. So far as the first three management 
functions are concerned, we think that they are, in the aggregate, 
far less demanding than those they displace under the BAT 
system. 
Taking the three functions in reverse order, we assume that 
Professor Latin would agree that a system of title registration is 
within the range of bureaucratic possibility. In contrast, the sec- 
ond task-running fair and efficient auctions-is a complicated 
affair, and it is easy to imagine such a system run incompetently 
or corruptly. Nonetheless, other agencies seem to have done 
similar jobs in satisfactory fashions: If the Department of Inte- 
rior can auction off oil and gas leases competently,34 we see no 
reason the EPA could not do the same for pollution rights. Fi- 
nally, there remains the task of estimating the total allowable 
wasteload permitted under existing law in each watershed and air 
control region. If the BAT system functioned properly, these 
numbers would be easy to obtain. EPA's regional administrators 
would simply have to add up the allowed amounts appearing in 
the permits that are in their filing cabinets. We have no illusions, 
however, about present realities: So much bureaucratic time and 
energy has been diverted into the counterproductive factfinding 
tasks generated by the BAT system, and so little attention has 
been paid to actual discharges, that even the data needed for 
these simple arithmetic operations may well be incomplete and 
inadequate. Nonetheless, total permitted emissions in a region 
34. We are commenting here on the Department's technical success in running 
auctions, not on the substantive policies it has pursued in the past or present. 
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can be approximated in order to get a system of permits and auc- 
tions started. Surely this start-up effort would be less complex 
than the unending inquiries into available technologies required 
by the existing system. 
We believe, in short, that Latin has confused the novel with 
the complex in his condemnation of the auction proposal. While 
it is true that the three new tasks involved in running the re- 
formed system are novel, they seem, in the aggregate, a good 
deal easier to discharge than the bureaucratic functions they dis- 
place. Moreover, what little experience the EPA has had with 
market approaches supports this conclusion. While Latin com- 
pletely ignores this important evidence, the fact is that the EPA 
has effectively discharged the bureaucratic tasks necessary to de- 
velop its market-based "bubble" and "tradeoff" control strate- 
gies under the Clean Air Act. These strategies create limited 
markets in pollution rights by: 1) allowing a new source to offset 
its new emissions by inducing an existing source to reduce its 
discharges (this is the so-called "tradeoff' policy); 2) allowing an 
existing source that is expanding to reallocate control burdens 
among its existing and new units (new source bubble); and 3) 
allowing existing sources in the same region to reallocate control 
burdens (state implementation plan bubble).35 The use of these 
innovations was for many years clouded by legal uncertainties 
until the Supreme Court recently rejected challenges from some 
environmental groups.36 Despite this uncertainty, the Clean Air 
Act bubble policy alone, in limited use for only a few years, has 
achieved compliance cost savings of over $700 million without 
any reduction (and in some cases an increase) in pollution 
control.37 
More recently, the EPA has successfully instituted and man- 
aged a tradeable permit system among refiners in connection 
with an EPA-mandated phasedown of lead additives in gasoline. 
35. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 13-14, and sources cited therein. 
36. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 
2778 (1984). 
37. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 52-56; sources cited supra note 12. Like 
any policy innovation, implementation of bubbles and tradeoffs raises numerous admin- 
istrative and legal micro-problems. See LIROFF, THE BUBBLE POLICY AND EMISSIONS 
TRADING: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF REGULATORY REFORM (1985). As the Liroff study 
shows, many of these problems are caused by the effort to graft a limited system of 
tradeable pollution rights onto an existing regulatory system. Our proposal would en- 
tirely replace that system with tradeable rights, eliminating many of the complexities of a 
hybrid approach. 
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Refiners with higher lead-reduction costs buy lead rights from 
refiners with lower costs. All refiners file quarterly reports show- 
ing the lead content of their gasoline, as well as sales and 
purchases of rights with other refiners. Three-quarters of all re- 
finers participate in purchases and sales of lead rights. The sys- 
tem will save hundreds of millions of dollars compared to 
uniform BAT commands.38 
In ignoring this record, it is Latin, not the reformers, who is 
"short on empiricism." The time is ripe for a market reform of 
the kind we have just described. Rather than using tradeable 
emission rights as a limited modification of BAT strategies, the 
bubble and tradeoff approaches should be generalized to permit 
regional trading of all air and water pollution permits. More- 
over, the tradeable permit strategy should be used to deal with 
pollution problems-such as acid rain-that are currently unreg- 
ulated and could be handled efficiently and effectively through 
economic incentives.39 
Would a system of marketable rights preclude improvement 
of environmental quality? By no means. The initial stock of 
rights can be amortized on a fixed schedule in order to reach a 
targeted goal, or the government may decide not to reissue ex- 
isting rights after they expire.40 Any such reductions will in- 
crease the price of rights by reducing supply. Prices will also 
automatically tend to rise over time as the economy grows and 
the demand for rights increases. Under a BAT approach, by con- 
trast, regulators must consistently undertake new, difficult, and 
unpopular initiatives to impose ever more stringent BAT con- 
trols on existing sources in order to accommodate economic 
growth without increased pollution. The prospect of steady in- 
creases in the price of rights will be a powerful incentive- far 
more powerful than the patchwork efforts at "technology forc- 
38. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, COSTS AND BENE- 
FITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (1985). 
39. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 14-15, and sources cited therein. Nor do we see 
any reason to limit the use of tradeable permits to air and water pollution problems. As 
we argue in the next section, hazards from toxic chemicals might appropriately be con- 
trolled through a system of "risk rights." Under this system, producers of new pesti- 
cides or other chemicals would purchase rights from existing producers or compete 
successfully for rights at one of the regular EPA auctions. Either way, the entry of new 
producers would force existing producers to reduce existing risk, thereby ensuring that 
the new product would not increase the total risk from chemicals faced by society. 
40. See note 23 supra. 
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ing" under the BAT system-for businesses to develop cleaner 
products and processes. 
A more serious objection to our proposal is that it ignores the 
problem of defining the region within which trades are permit- 
ted. The short answer is that the EPA and the States have already 
divided the nation into several hundred air quality control re- 
gions; similarly, the states have delineated the watershed bound- 
aries for pollution control and other water management 
purposes.41 Rather than starting from scratch, our proposal can 
proceed on the basis of these existing boundaries. Especially in 
the area of air pollution, however, we have no doubt that existing 
regional lines have been drawn in a way that is extremely insensi- 
tive to ecological realities.42 We strongly recommend, therefore, 
that a reformed statute provide a mechanism for the orderly re- 
examination of existing regional boundaries-although it may 
well be wiser to defer this question for five or ten years to allow 
the EPA to concentrate on the challenges involved in managing 
the transition to a marketable permit system. 
Latin is on stronger ground, we believe, in emphasizing that a 
reformed implementation system would not easily solve all fore- 
seeable regulatory problems. In particular, the market system we 
have described could allow the creation of relatively high concen- 
trations of particular pollutants in small areas within the larger 
pollution control region. In tolerating "hot spots," of course, 
our reform proposal shares the defects of the existing BAT sys- 
tem, which also generates risk of "hot spots" by imposing the 
same controls on sources regardless of their location, the size of 
the human population affected by their discharges, and the na- 
ture and vulnerability of affected ecosystems.43 Nonetheless, the 
41. Most major lake and river systems are the subject of intense water quantity and 
water quality management under watershed systems established under state law or inter- 
state compacts. We would establish the geographic boundaries of water pollution per- 
mit markets by reference to these systems. 
42. They typically follow state lines, for example, leading to extremely unwieldly 
efforts by courts to take interregional impacts into account. See, e.g., Connecticut v. EPA, 
656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 
1980) (per curiam). 
43. Existing federal laws contain some provisions to prevent excessive local envi- 
ronmental damage from sources that already comply with BAT standards. But as Latin 
notes, these provisions have not been effectively implemented. We believe that an im- 
portant reason for this failure is the diversion of bureaucratic energies into BAT deter- 
minations. Thus, even in our first-generation proposals for reform, it may be possible to 
design crude, but useful, mechanisms by which the EPA can realistically respond to "hot 
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blindness of both systems to intraregional variation is a serious 
source of concern. The extensive literature on marketable per- 
mits-almost entirely ignored by Latin-points to a variety of 
feasible means for dealing with the hot spot problem.44 We be- 
lieve that a long-run strategy for institutional reform should 
strive to take advantage of these more sophisticated market solu- 
tions to the problem of intraregional variation. For the present, it 
will be enough to emphasize our agreement with Latin's caution 
that administrative feasibility is an important constraint on the 
degree of sophistication that we may reasonably expect.45 
The critical question here, however, is not whether our mar- 
ket reform fails to solve problems that the BAT system also fails 
to solve. It is whether the reformed implementation system will 
generate new problems that offset its great economic, environ- 
mental, and administrative advantages. Curiously, Latin fails to 
note one potential difficulty that may prove significant. We can 
foresee situations in which existing polluters might try to manip- 
ulate the rights market to deter entry by new firms in a way that is 
inconsistent with the antitrust laws, by either monopolizing the 
pollution rights market itself, or using it to block entry by com- 
petitors. There is, however, a considerable literature in which 
problems like this are discussed,46 and we ourselves' have worried 
about them.47 Neither Latin nor anybody else, however, has of- 
fered a list of particular administrative problems that remotely 
offset the multiple advantages of a system reformed in the man- 
ner we have sketched here. 
III. GOALS 
We now address reforms that have more to do with the way 
existing policy goals are established than with the way they are 
spots" once it has been liberated from its BAT routines. All we can do here, however, is 
to flag this problem of statutory design as deserving high priority on the reform agenda. 
44. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 64-86, and sources cited therein. 
45. The need to strengthen regulatory institutions on the regional level is dis- 
cussed further at text accompanying note 57 infra. 
46. See, e.g., T. TIETENBERG, supra note 11, chs. 4, 6, & 7 and sources cited therein; 
Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 
PUB. POL'Y 383 (1977). 
47. B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN,J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, supra note 11, 
at 275-81; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1336. Administrative authorities may also have to 
play a "market-maker" role in the rights market in order to ensure an adequate supply 
of rights at all times and smooth out price fluctuations, see J. DALES, supra note 11, at 
94-95, although it is possible that private institutions could discharge these functions. 
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implemented. Latin writes as if our proposals aimed for a system 
in which "[d]ecisionmakers must evaluate all relevant ecological 
circumstances, human impacts, and regulatory costs to identify 
the "optimal" level of environmental protection in particular 
controversies or locations."48 We have never advocated any such 
utopian scheme; our writings demonstrate that we have been well 
aware of the problems of limited information and excessive regu- 
latory complexity. 
Instead, it is Latin who has fallen into the trap of supposing 
that the only relevant alternative to the status quo is a fantastic 
rococo system in which every conceivable form of "fine-tuning" 
is institutionalized immediately. We reject this view. Rather than 
imagining reform as one extravagant "great leap forward," we 
envision a series of steps in an ongoing process of piecemeal im- 
provement. Each element in the reform program can be imple- 
mented at a different time and should be evaluated on its own 
merits. Thus, the market implementation mechanism described 
in the preceding section was a piecemeal reform based on the 
allowable pollution loads prevailing under existing law. Even if 
Latin's critique of "fine-tuning" in the goal-setting process were 
entirely correct, the merits of the marketable rights program as 
an implementing mechanism would remain untouched. Simi- 
larly, we regard the policymaking proposals we make in this sec- 
tion as a series of discrete steps toward a more democratic, and 
more enlightened, dialogue on the nature of America's evolving 
environmental objectives. While some immediate reforms will 
lay the foundation for further advances, we hope that doubts 
about the institutional feasibility of some of our long-run propos- 
als will not deflect attention from feasible short-term reforms 
that promise immediate and substantial improvements. 
A. A Short-Term Strategy: Redesigning Statutory Variables 
To focus first on the short-term prospect for clear and pres- 
ent improvement, we begin by provisionally accepting Latin's as- 
sertion that administrative and political difficulties in devising 
nonuniform standards dictate uniform federal environmental 
objectives throughout the nation, regardless of regional varia- 
tions. Even if we accept this constraint, we can nonetheless build 
upon the preceding marketable rights proposal in a way that en- 
48. Latin, supra note 1, at 1275. 
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hances the democratic quality of the policymaking process. At 
present, the BAT system focuses congressional debate, as well as 
administrative and judicial proceedings, upon arcane technologi- 
cal and definitional questions which rapidly outstrip the time and 
energy that most politicians and citizens are willing to spend on 
environmental matters. In contrast, the marketable permit sys- 
tem will allow the policymaking debate to take a far more intelli- 
gible shape. Rather than debating the difference between the 
"best available control technology" and "lowest achievable emis- 
sion rate,"49 citizens will be encouraged to focus on a different 
question when the environmental acts come up for revision: 
During the next n years, should we instruct the EPA gradually to 
decrease (or increase) the number of pollution rights by x per- 
cent? Environmentalists will, of course, argue for big reductions; 
others, who are more impressed with the costs of control, will 
argue for smaller reductions or even selective increases. But at 
least the congressional debate would be encouraged to focus 
upon the fundamental question: Speaking broadly, do the Amer- 
ican people believe existing environmental objectives are too am- 
bitious (in which case Congress should increase the number of 
rights), or do they think that Congress should cut back further on 
pollution by cutting back on the number of rights? 
Rather than supposing-as Latin intimates-that such a ques- 
tion should be answered by a cost-benefit analysis, we believe 
that it is the quintessentially political question that should be an- 
swered by the legislative process. The great virtue of the market- 
able permit program is that it puts the question in an operational 
form accessible to the general public. An analogy from a very 
different policy area may be instructive. Imagine that the Depart- 
ment of Labor refused to report an unemployment rate each 
month. Instead, when it was asked about the employment situa- 
tion, it inundated its audience with stories about how workers in 
one or another industry might be displaced or reemployed by 
one or another technology. While such stories are informative, 
wouldn't there be a great danger that the general public and 
Congress would miss the forest for the trees? The preeminent 
question that generalist decisionmakers can and should answer is 
49. See Clean Air Act ? 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. ? 7475(a)(4) (BAT requirements appli- 
cable to new sources in prevention of significant deterioration areas); Clean Air Act 
? 171(3), 42 U.S.C. ? 7501(3) (BAT requirements applicable to new sources in nonat- 
tainment areas). 
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how much overall unemployment is tolerable. And for this pur- 
pose, the unemployment rate functions as a key control variable. 
The same holds true in environmental policy: A vote on a propo- 
sal to change the overall number of pollution permits would be a 
vehicle for the democratic formulation of policy superior to any 
generated by the existing BAT regulatory system. 
To put the point more broadly, we propose the use of a new 
statutory control variable in the design of our environmental stat- 
utes. Rather than speaking in technology-based terms, the key statu- 
tory variables would be pollution-based. More precisely, they 
would specify the rate of change in existing levels of pollution that 
Congress wishes to achieve during the period until the Clean Air 
Act once more comes up for congressional reconsideration. 
Under the revised system, Congress would no longer content it- 
self with mouthing pieties about the need to achieve "reasonable 
further progress"50 in environmental protection. It would in- 
stead specify, in quantitative terms, how much change is "reason- 
able" by voting for an n percent reduction (or increase) in the 
number of aggregate permits that the EPA would be allowed to 
auction off annually to the nation's polluters.51 This single 
change, we believe, would vastly increase the degree to which the 
critical questions of environmental policy can be framed in a way 
that is more transparent to the general public. 
This single change, however, can only serve as a first step to- 
ward more transparent decisionmaking. Because it is limited to 
upward or downward adjustment of the aggregate pollution levels 
permitted under federal standards, it does not allow for more 
discriminating regulation of particular pollution problems. We 
see no reason, though, for Congress to content itself with the 
crude uniformity that Latin commends. For example, within the 
general context of a 20% rights reduction, Congress might target 
certain pollutants for a 40% reduction, while allowing others to 
be reduced by only 5%. Similarly, Congress may announce prin- 
ciples concerning the way in which the reductions should be allo- 
cated across the nation: For example, should stricter cutbacks be 
scheduled in areas violating primary or secondary health stan- 
dards? In ecologically sensitive areas? If so, by how much? 
50. See Clean Air Act ? 171(1), 42 U.S.C. ? 7501(1). 
51. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 8 (authors proposed a similar reduction 
schedule to deal with noncompliance with federal air quality standards under the Clean 
Air Act). 
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Latin insists that such decisions would require Congress to 
guess about countless contestable matters involving both facts 
and values. And in this he is surely right. The fact is, however, 
that these uncertainties already exist, and it is precisely because 
they cannot be resolved technocratically that they should be 
framed in a way that invites self-conscious political decision by the 
Congress. In contrast, the BAT system fails to focus attention on 
the overall rate at which America should clean up the environ- 
ment, leaving it to unguided and disjointed bureaucratic and ju- 
dicial decision in an endless series of BAT inquiries into the 
"availability" of one or another cleanup technology. 
B. Long-Term Strategies: Toward Decentralization and Constrained 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
While the piecemeal "first-generation" change described in 
the previous subsection stands on its own merits, it also lays the 
foundation for a "second-generation" reform in setting environ- 
mental goals: Congress would create a statutory foundation for 
legally constrained cost-efectiveness analysis. Like the first-generation 
approach, this second-generation statute would express itself in 
terms of a change-oriented, pollution-based command. Imagine, 
for example, that the reformed statute mandated a 20% reduc- 
tion in allowable pollution levels over the next ten years. In con- 
trast to our first-generation approach, however, the statute would 
not insist that the 20% cutback be obtained in each and every 
part of the country, or in those areas specified by Congress. In- 
stead, the EPA, in conjunction with state and regional authori- 
ties, would be given discretion to allocate the cleanup effort. So 
long as an average 20% cutback was achieved, the statute would 
enable administrators to force some areas to cut back up to 30% 
while allowing others to cut back only 10%- provided that they 
could support these judgments with a thoughtful cost-effective- 
ness analysis indicating that such variations would lead to cut- 
backs where they would do the most good in reducing health 
risks and harm to the environment. 
In allowing for limited regional variation, we would be mak- 
ing a final break with the BAT insistence upon nationwide uni- 
formity. We believe that completely uniform goals are seriously 
dysfunctional, producing too much control in some regions, too 
little in others, and completely missing special problems in still 
other regions. A notorious example of mindless uniformity is the 
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effluent limitations imposed by the present Clean Water Act, 
which have required the same level of cleanup by all plants in a 
given industry, regardless of whether a plant discharges into an 
ocean or large lake, where the discharges will have little or no 
effect, or into a pristine river.52 This blindness to environmental 
reality-which is replicated in many other areas53-is a parody of 
the ecological consciousness that should motivate sound 
policymaking. 
Latin, however, opposes every institutional step aimed to take 
regional variation into account. He attacks our advocacy of con- 
strained cost-effectiveness analysis by supposing that we cham- 
pion a slide rule determination of economically optimal controls 
for every source of every pollutant in every region. As we have 
already noted, we have never advocated such views. Our own 
study of particular problems, however, has convinced us that it is 
possible to conduct an intelligent debate about whether, for ex- 
ample, it makes more sense to clean up the Delaware River in the 
vicinity of Philadelphia or whether greater percentage cutbacks 
are warranted in the ecologically threatened regions of the Dela- 
ware Bay.54 We fully agree that a narrow economic analysis can 
52. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982). The 
original system of nationally uniform ambient air quality standards in the Clean Air Act, 
? 109, 42 U.S.C. ? 7409, have been transformed into a nonuniform system by subse- 
quent amendments that recognize the difficulty of achieving the standards in nonattain- 
ment areas, see Clean Air Act ?? 171-78, 42 U.S.C. ?? 7501-08, and the desirability of 
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) in clean air regions, see Clean Air Act 
?? 160- 69A, 42 U.S.C. ?? 7470-79, 7491. The nonattainment and PSD systems are not 
based, however, on ecological and health realities, but on the happenstance of BAT 
implementation and the historical accident that some regions have been less industrially 
developed, and therefore less polluted, than others. 
53. Consider recent congressional proposals to deal with toxic pollution problems 
by mandatory uniform BAT controls on industrial sources. For example, H.R. 2576, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), introduced by Congressmen Wirth, Waxman, and Florio, 
would require the EPA to set stringent BAT standards for 85 named chemical sub- 
stances, plus any additional substances that might contribute to serious illness. Any citi- 
zen could petition the EPA to designate a substance, and the EPA would be required to 
respond within 180 days. If the EPA failed to set stringent standards for any such sub- 
stance within two years, the applicable standard would be "no detectable release." This 
is the use of an indiscriminate BAT strategy with a vengeance, ignoring evidence sug- 
gesting that many problems are localized ones in which nonindustrial sources play a 
major role. See E. Haemisegger, The Air Toxic Problem in the United States: An Analy- 
sis of Cancer Risks for Selected Pollutants (EPA-450/1-85-001 (1985)); U.S. Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, A Strategy to Reduce Risks to Public Health from Air Toxics 
(June 1985). See also Harrington, Krupnick & Peskin, Policies for Nonpoint-source Water Pol- 
lution Control, 40 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 27 (1985). 
54. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, supra note 
11. 
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only serve as part of an answer to such questions; nonetheless, it 
is also wrong to imagine that these questions can be responsibly 
answered without taking costs, as well as benefits, into account. 
In the end, of course, there will be no escaping the inherently 
controversial nature of the particular administrative judgments in 
which cost-effectiveness analysis plays some role. So long as par- 
ticular agency decisions are made within a larger framework of 
Congressional policy, however, we believe that they will generate 
an ongoing public discussion that will, over time, greatly enhance 
the insight with which the nation confronts its environmental 
dilemmas .55 
Latin opposes ecologically and economically sensitive goal- 
setting exercises on the ground that our empirical understanding 
of the relevant factors is often rudimentary. But this falsely sup- 
poses that cost-effectiveness analysis is useful only when it deliv- 
ers clear and decisive technocratic answers to policy problems. 
In our view, such analyses only serve to guide, and not displace, 
intelligent guesswork. The question is whether we operate under 
a system, like BAT, which tries to ignore or suppress uncertainty, 
or whether we operate in a world in which decisionmakers are 
encouraged to make their guesses as openly and intelligently as 
they can.56 The goal for a second-generation statute is to create 
a system in which decisionmakers can make limited variations in 
national priorities in the light of their best guesses about the re- 
gional realities they confront. 
We entirely agree with Latin, however, that an immediate 
55. See Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 
YALE LJ. 1617 (1985). 
56. Agency officials may fear that more explicit acknowledgment of uncertainty will 
make agency decisions more vulnerable on judicial review. But the record suggests that 
this fear is, as a general matter, unfounded. Courts generally respect agency choices 
that explicitly acknowledge uncertainty. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 
548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 
647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
EPA, 673 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (agencies must provide explanations for their 
decisions and must have adequate studies to reduce key uncertainties. Where agencies 
suppress uncertainty and seek to base decisions on narrow economic or technological 
grounds-as the BAT strategy encourages them to do-their decisions are often more 
vulnerable because the agency's resolution of these technical issues can more readily be 
shown to be empirically or technically flawed. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckel- 
shaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); 513 F.2d 506 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (BAT air pollution standards); Weyerhaeu- 
ser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (BAT water pollution control 
standards). 
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statutory embrace of regional variation would be premature at 
the present time. Before taking such a step, we must first con- 
struct stronger regional institutions than now exist in the 
overcentralized federal system. We look forward to a day when 
we might go to any region in the country and find a serious pro- 
fessional staff that could both describe the existing environmen- 
tal data and models and explain how they propose to improve 
them over the next five or ten years. Without such an ongoing 
system of data collection and analysis, there can be little hope of 
designing regulatory systems which are sensitive to regional eco- 
logical and economic realities. Rather than conceiving the con- 
struction of such ongoing regional centers as a bit of "fine- 
tuning," we think that their absence constitutes one of the princi- 
pal failures of the present system.57 Indeed, if an effort at re- 
gional institution-building had been inaugurated 15 years ago 
with the enactment of the Clean Air and Water Acts, Professor 
Latin's assertions about the abysmal state of our ignorance 
would, by now, have less justification. 
It is wrong, moreover, to assume that our failure to construct 
the requisite regional infrastructure is simply a result of tight 
EPA budgets.58 The agency, after all, has spent plenty of time 
and money engaging in factfinding inquiry regarding the state of 
the best available technology. The reason for the infrastructural 
failure is that ongoing careful region-by-region study is irrelevant 
to the regulatory effort as defined by the present BAT system. 
To change agency incentives, our reformed law would expressly 
contemplate a more sophisticated form of auction to commence 
at some future point in time, say 10 or 15 years after enactment. 
Under these second-generation actions, different regions of the 
country could be allowed to cut back permitted quantities by dif- 
57. What we propose is the modern-day equivalent of the plan, aired but never 
pushed in Franklin Roosevelt's second term, for a series of regional TVAs throughout 
the nation. See B. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, 
164-67 (1983). 
58. See note 28 supra, for the paltry sums that are presently invested in the effort to 
monitor environmental realities. It is, of course, no easy matter to create strong re- 
gional authorities within our political system. But the TVA experience suggests that the 
federal government can most readily promote such authorities by endowing them with 
economic resources and responsibility for their management. By contrast, it is far more 
difficult to create new authorities with the power, customarily reserved to the national 
and state governments, to issue and coercively enforce legally binding orders. Accord- 
ingly, the shift in tools from BAT commands to transferable pollution permits-the fed- 
erally created resource which our proposed new authorities would manage-will 
facilitate the development of regional institutions. 
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ferent amounts on the basis of a thoughtful cost-effectiveness 
analysis; similarly, each regional authority would be allowed to 
vary cutbacks within its region to account for special conditions.59 
At no point, however, would we endorse unfettered technocratic 
cost-benefit analysis. Congress would continue to decide the 
overall magnitude of natural cleanup and to stipulate an allowa- 
ble range of variation that could be justified through regional 
analysis and decision. 
C. Priority-Setting 
Our final set of proposals seeks to correct serious deficiencies 
in the process by which the current BAT system sets priorities in 
the light of changing information about environmental realities. 
BAT discourages intelligent priority-setting for two related rea- 
sons. First, the EPA is so overwhelmed by factfinding tasks re- 
quired to implement a technology-based approach that it has 
relatively few resources left for exploration of risks posed by new 
pollutants. Second, BAT imposes heavy bureaucratic costs on 
the EPA every time it recognizes a new threat to the environ- 
ment. Once a new pollutant has been identified, BAT requires 
the agency to exhaust itself with yet another series of never-end- 
ing inquiries into the state of control technology in each of the 
industries that have been discharging the "newly discovered" 
pollutant and to establish an elaborate set of new industry-by- 
industry standards. Finally, once a pollutant has been targeted 
for regulation, BAT automatically requires the imposition of con- 
trols to the full extent of available technology60-a potentially 
enormous commitment of compliance resources that may not be 
justified by the benefits achieved and that is likely to be strongly 
59. Of course, if the agency did not exercise its discretion, or if its regional vari- 
ances did not survive judicial review, the national average (in our example, 20 %) would 
apply in the regions affected. Given its long-run perspective, a second-generation stat- 
ute could also provide a schedule that would contemplate a lengthy period for adminis- 
trative rulemaking and judicial review. 
60. "Available technology" is an elastic concept. In many instances, including 
most cases of water pollution, technology is available in an engineering sense to elimi- 
nate pollution entirely. If we were willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars, we 
could have drinking water flowing from industrial waste discharge pipes (although dis- 
posing of the pollutants removed from waste streams could present serious problems). 
Accordingly, most decisions about "available" technology must-implicitly or explic- 
itly- take costs into account. The vice of the BAT strategy is that it ignores this inevita- 
ble cost-benefit consideration, or at best buries it, by treating it as an engineering 
decision about technological feasibility. 
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opposed by industry through protracted litigation. It should be 
no surprise, then, that the EPA has, in fact, been reluctant to ex- 
pand the number of its pollution targets.6' 
The administrative inertia generated by BAT was, perhaps, of 
secondary concern so long as one could believe that environmen- 
tal degradation was the product of a few widespread pollutants, 
each of which should be controlled to the greatest extent feasible 
within a period of years. After a decade's practical experience 
with environmental regulation, however, it should be clear that 
there are thousands of substances that pose at least some risk and 
that we cannot deal with all of them simultaneously or impose 
BAT on all of them within the near future. The defect of the 
BAT system is that it tends to select, more or less arbitrarily, a 
relatively few pollutants and devotes enormous administrative 
and control resources to regulating them to the hilt. 
The reforms we have already advocated will create new incen- 
tives for the innovative priority-setting that is needed in today's 
world. First, a statute whose control variables were pollution- 
based, rather than technology-based, would encourage a more 
focused discussion of whether the goals set for different pollu- 
tants reflect sensible priorities. Indeed, it is not fanciful to sup- 
pose that a risk portfolio strategy eventually might emerge that 
would explicitly attempt to rank the comparative risks confronted 
by an EPA or an OSHA and then use cost-effectiveness analysis 
to determine how available administrative and control resources 
might best be devoted to minimizing overall risk in a given time 
period.62 Such a strategy need not be limited to conventional air 
61. Courts have empowered environmental plaintiffs to force agency action upon 
presentation of a prima facie case that a currently unregulated pollutant presents a sub- 
stantial hazard, see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 
(D.C. Cir. 1971), and Congress has codified these rulings in "action-forcing" statutory 
"citizen-suit" provisions. See, e.g., Clean Air Act ? 304, 42 U.S.C. ? 7604; H.R. 2576, 
note 53 supra. While agency inaction is, as we have noted, a serious problem under a 
BAT regime, the reliance on "action-forcing" through litigation may well be a cure 
worse than the disease. Such a strategy invites a "pollutant of the month" approach to 
priority-setting. There is no assurance that the initiatives selected by different environ- 
mental groups will result in a sensible allocation of limited administrative and compli- 
ance resources. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 
1649 (1985) may reduce "action-forcing" litigation in the context of regulatory statutes 
that do not contain citizen-suit provisions. See generally Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction 
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985). But this would merely alleviate 
symptoms of the current BAT system without providing any positive incentives for intel- 
ligent priority-setting. 
62. In order to reduce some of the administrative and other problems involved in 
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and water pollutants. It could also be used, for example, to man- 
age the risks posed by pesticides, chemicals, or hazardous 
wastes.63 
Second, the adoption of a marketable permit scheme would 
dramatically change bureaucratic incentives involved in a deci- 
sion to target a new pollutant. Rather than ignoring new 
problems in an effort to avoid BAT burdens, the EPA may well 
gain additional bureaucratic resources by altering its regulatory 
priorities, since our proposed statutory reform would reward the 
agency with a share of any auction revenues that any newly regu- 
lated pollutant might generate. Indeed, given their budgetary re- 
wards, a critic might fear that our proposals would generate an 
equal and opposite danger from the one prevailing under the 
current regime: Why wouldn't the EPA be transformed into a 
hyperactive agency, eager to maximize its budgetary revenues by 
expanding its concern to "pollutants" that do not in fact threaten 
any serious risk to ecological or human values? 
While hyperactivity is a danger, its seriousness should not be 
exaggerated. After all, every large bureaucratic organization ex- 
establishing separate permits and markets for many different pollutants, a "mutual 
fund" variant of the portfolio approach might be used, where appropriate, to control 
related pollutants through permits based on a weighted average of volume and risk. 
63. Development of such strategies will take considerable time, and there will inev- 
itably remain discrete sources of risk that must be dealt with through command-and- 
control standards or screening procedures. In these limited contexts, regulatory negoti- 
ation may be a promising mechanism for promoting more informed regulatory decision- 
making that is sensitive to the magnitude of various risks and the practical problems of 
managing them. 
Latin devotes extensive energies to criticizing those portions of Stewart, note 5 
supra, that favor increased experimentation with regulatory negotiation. While legiti- 
mately raising many real questions and doubts about the practicality and desirability of 
regulatory negotiation, Latin commits characteristic errors. First, he supposes that the 
author regards regulatory negotiation as one of a host of fungible "fine-tuning" mecha- 
nisms. The article in fact makes quite clear that regulatory negotiation is a "second 
best" ameliorative solution, and that economic incentive systems are a basic and pre- 
ferred alternative to the existing command-and-control system. Second, Latin com- 
pletely ignores recent practical experience that regulatory negotiation can work 
successfully to alleviate the worst features of the present adversary, legalistic regulatory 
system. Contrary to Latin's a priori predictions, the developing experience with regula- 
tory negotiation shows that self-interested business, advocacy, and governmental groups 
and authorities in fact find negotiated solutions preferable to the expense and uncer- 
tainty of protracted legal proceedings. See Lempert, Participants See Value in Reg-Neg's 
First Flight, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983, at 2, col. 1 (partial success of regulatory negoti- 
ation at FAA); Miller, Steel Effluent Limitations: Success at the Negotiating Table, 13 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,094 (1983); L. Susskind &J. McMahon, Documentation of EPA's Nonconform- 
ance Penalties (NCP) Negotiated Rulemaking Demonstration (Report to U.S. EPA, Jan. 
1985). 
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periences a great deal of difficulty redefining its priorities. Given 
the reality of bureaucratic inertia, and the fact that industry will 
continue to resist new initiatives (particularly when it must pay 
for the right to pollute),64 we believe that it is wiser to offer budg- 
etary rewards for innovative priority-setting rather than allow 
BAT to reinforce bureaucratic reluctance to take changing envi- 
ronmental realities into account. 
Our proposed shift in bureaucratic incentives, however, does 
reinforce the need for a regulatory structure that endorses 
thoughtful cost-effectiveness analysis in the priority-setting pro- 
cess. Up to the present time, legislators have been able to in- 
dulge in apparently absolute statutory prohibitions of all harmful 
pollutants. This was possible because legislators could count on 
regulatory lethargy and covert consideration of costs by adminis- 
trators in defining BAT to blunt statutory calls for an all-out war 
on pollution. Once a reformed statute has changed the balance 
of incentives for bureaucratic innovation, we should insist on 
thoughtful cost-effectiveness analysis before a new pollutant is 
made the subject of a marketable permit auction. The critical 
question, in each case, should be whether available administra- 
tive and compliance resources will achieve more reduction in en- 
vironmental risks if they are used to control the new pollutant 
rather than being used to deal with other pollutants. (For these 
purposes, costs-like benefits- should not be measured in any 
mechanical way, and will inevitably involve major social judg- 
ments.) If so, the "new" pollutant should be regulated on the 
basis of the same pollution-based principles that we have elabo- 
rated previously; if not, it should not be regulated. Of course, 
even if an agency refused to list a new pollutant, Congress would 
be free to force the agency to change its mind the next time the 
governing statute is reappraised.65 Once again, cost-benefit anal- 
ysis would be subordinated to democratic decision. 
Finally, we do not believe that all steps toward more intelli- 
64. Industry pressure will also operate to offset potential EPA reluctance, for fiscal 
reasons, to increase the number of permits for a pollutant already being regulated when 
new evidence shows that the risks it poses are not nearly as great as originally believed. 
65. Given the need for agency flexibility in priority-setting and the dangers of judi- 
cial inculcation of the "pollutant of the month" syndrome, we would exclude full-scale 
judicial review of decisions whether or not to initiate regulatory action against particular 
substances in all but extreme cases of arbitrariness, provided that a regulatory agency had 
developed an informed and reasonable process of priority-setting under which the re- 
fusal to act in a particular case can be justified. 
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gent priority-setting should be delayed until the adoption of 
some of the more far-reaching reforms we have advanced. It 
should be emphasized that analysis of costs and benefits is not, as 
some environmentalists too easily suppose, a code word for regu- 
latory passivity. A stunning counterexample is the EPA's recent 
decision substantially to eliminate lead additives in gasoline. The 
key to this decision was an economic analysis performed in the 
EPA's Office of Planning and Policy Evaluation showing that the 
move would achieve major health benefits at little or no net 
cost.66 Critics like Latin, moreover, underestimate the amount of 
information which does exist, but which is ignored by regulators 
who refuse to confront ecological and economic realities. The 
EPA, for example, routinely develops information relating each 
industry's costs of control to the amount of pollution or risk the 
industry's investment can be expected to eliminate.67 It simply 
fails to use this available information to make the allocation of 
burdens among industries more cost-effective or to target en- 
forcement resources to the highest-priority problems. Recent 
changes in the EPA's approach-again, ignored by Latin-show 
that such steps are feasible. For example, the EPA recently de- 
cided not to regulate emissions of acrylonitrile and other toxic 
emissions under section 112 of the Clean Air Act when analysis 
suggested that the risks involved were relatively low compared to 
the more serious problems posed by chromium emissions- 
which it did decide to regulate.68 Such examples show that it is 
feasible to do a better job of goal-setting-by introducing cost- 
effectiveness considerations in evaluating control options for dif- 
ferent risks and setting priorities more intelligently-even within 
the existing BAT system. 
Steps such as these will not necessarily impose greater bur- 
dens on administrators than those that prevail under the BAT 
approach.69 Even when they do involve additional burdens for 
66. See note 38 supra. 
67. See, e.g., Crandall, supra note 7, at 214-15 (EPA data reproduced in table 8.1). 
68. See "EPA to List Chromium Under Section 112, Decides Not to List Four Other 
Substances," 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEVs. 236 (une 7, 1985); Harrison, Haig & Nich- 
ols, note 10 supra. 
69. For example, in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments, Con- 
gress imposed uniform technology-based standards in order to avoid the transaction 
costs and implementation problems involved in policing environmental quality stan- 
dards. In order to simplify decisionmaking, the 1972 Act ignored variations in water 
quality uses and goals. In implementing the Act, however, the EPA felt compelled to 
consider cost and other variables indirectly in setting BAT standards. This indirect ap- 
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administrators, however, this fact alone should not condemn 
them. The question is whether increased administrative costs are 
outweighed by greater benefits for society as a whole. The EPA's 
development of the bubble and tradeoff policies required addi- 
tional information-gathering, analysis, and other effort. But the 
payoff has been enormous. The bubble alone has saved over 
$700 million70 and stimulated new ways of cleaning up pollution. 
To focus on administrative costs, without considering the societal 
benefits of more intelligent regulation, produces penny-wise and 
pound-foolish public policies. Such myopia is understandable, if 
not excusable, in politicians. It should not be encouraged by aca- 
demics who ignore solid evidence that reform can and has 
worked. 
CONCLUSION 
In urging the fundamental reform of environmental law, we 
do not mean to disparage the very great accomplishments of the 
generation that enacted sweeping federal legislation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Apart from the many unambiguous 
achievements of this statutory revolution, even the embrace of a 
BAT approach made some sense as a crude first-generation strat- 
egy. During the early days of federal environmental concern, 
perhaps it was plausible for politicians and other policymakers to 
suppose that only a few pollution problems were out of hand and 
that these problems could be "solved" in a short time by an all- 
out war against "pollution." From this perspective, it could seem 
reasonable to try to force everyone to adopt the best available 
technology everywhere. 
Our complaint is not with the statutory draftsmen of the early 
1970s, but with lawyers of the 1980s who fail to put these early 
statutes in historical perspective.71 Experience with more than a 
decade of intensive regulation emphasizes that the environmen- 
tal risks we confront are numerous and vary widely in serious- 
proach caused the EPA to set separate standards for over 500 different industry and 
subindustry standards, a majority of which were challenged in court. Long delays in 
implementing the statutory scheme resulted. See also R. MELNICK, supra note 9, at 
193-205 (chronicling problems in adjusting the uniform federal air quality standards to 
differing local and regional circumstances). 
70. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
71. For another effort to put these statutes in perspective, see Elliott, Ackerman & 
Millian, Toward A Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. 
LAW, ECON., & ORG. 313 (1985) (forthcoming). 
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ness. Our strategies for managing these risks must set intelligent 
priorities, make maximum use of the resources devoted to im- 
proving environmental quality, encourage environmentally supe- 
rior technologies, and avoid unneeded penalties on innovation 
and investment. Rather than wringing our hands helplessly 
before these complexities, the challenge is to incorporate matur- 
ing perceptions about our regulatory problems into the evolving 
legal structure-and help our fellow Americans build a system 
that will not only save many billions of dollars a year, but make 
environmental law more democratically accountable and bureau- 
cratically effective. It is time for environmental lawyers to stop 
celebrating the statutory revolution of the 1970s and to start 
building a statutory structure worthy of the year 2000. 
